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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA SMITH,
Plaintiff and Appellant, )
Case No. 14410
VS.

LYMAN S. SHREEVE,
Defendant and Respondent.)

RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL
***

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising from
an automobile accident which occurred at an intersection in
Provo, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff and awarded total damages in the
amount of $2,000.00. Plaintiff's subsequent motion for a
new trial was denied by the trial court.

-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant in this case seeks to have the case remanded
for a new trial.

Respondent seeks to have the judgment of

the lower court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As stated in the brief of appellant, this accident
occurred on December 5, 1971, at the intersection of 3230
North and 650 East Street in Provo, Utah.

This was a resi-

dential area with both intersecting streets being designed
for one lane of traffic in each direction.

The intersection

was an open intersection with no traffic control devices or
stop signs.

The accident occurred on a clear Sunday morning

although the roads were snowpacked from a prior snowstorm.
At the time of the accident, plaintiff, a 17 year old high
school student and her girlfriend, were driving around the
area visiting friends (P-139).

They entered the intersection

headed East, intending to make a left turn to the North.

De-

fendant, a language professor at BYU and his wife, were on
their way home from church traveling South (T-166).

They were

unable to stop for the car making a left turn in front of
them and a collision occurred (T-169,170).

The accident

occurred approximately in the matter as shown on the following

* This accident occurred prior to the effective date of the
Comparative Negligence Act and was tried under the principals
of Contributory
Digitized by theNegligence.
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diagram:

e.

w.

S.
Although there were several details to the accident
that

were in dispute, there was no serious controversy

concerning many of the material facts.

The actual colli-

sion did not occur within the intersection but either nineteen or thirty feet North thereof (the investigating officer
testified at the trial that the point of impact was thirty
feet North of the intersection, although his notes made out
at the time of the accident showed it as being nineteen feet
North of the intersection) (See T-18,19,30,44,53, Exhibits
D-ll and D-12).

The plaintiff's vehicle was still on an

angle of approximately 45° at the time of impact (T-17).
The impact to plaintiff's vehicle was near the left front
door (Exhibit D-8).

The impact to defendant's vehicle was

at the left front corner (T-34, Exhibit P-2,D-19).

Defendant's

vehicle was traveling straight South at the time of impact
(T-170,186).

Expert testimony at trial established without

contradiction that the impact speed was very low (within the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

range of 8 to 13 miles per hour) and that the relative speed
of defendant's vehicle was faster than that of the plaintiff's
(T-201,203).
A disputed fact at trial involved the question as to
whether the point of impact occurred on the East or West portion of the road, that is whether the defendant was driving
left of the center of the roadway.

The only evidence that

defendant may have been over the center line was the testimony
of Officer Tidwell, the investigating officer, who testified
to that effect (T-21).

Officer Tidwell also testified how-

ever, that at the time of impact plaintiff's automobile was
on a 45° angle and that the back of her vehicle had not yet
crossed over the center line and was in the defendant's lane
(T-17,21).

Thus, if the officer was correct in his opinion

as to the point of impact, such would have occurred just
slightly over the center line, as the impact to the plaintiff's
vehicle was at the front door, the car is on a 45° angle, and
the back of her car was in defendant's lane.

The testimony

of the investigating officer on this issue was further emasculated by the fact that he never actually measured the width
of the road at the place of impact.

His measurements were

taken at a point South of the intersection where he acknowledged that the road was narrower and not even the same width
as where the accident occurred (T-33,34).

Also the roads

were covered with snow and no determination was made of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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width of the actual travel portion of the road.

Both defen-

dant and his wife testified that they were traveling on their
own side of the road (T-168,185).

Defendant's expert witness

also testified in his opinion that the defendant's vehicle
was further to the West and clearly within his own lane of
travel; this testimony was based upon the fact that the center of the road was melting and the sides still snowpacked,
and that in order to skid straight forward as was the testimony of all witnesses that all four wheels would have had to
been on a surface with the same coefficiency of friction
(T-210,215).

There was no evidence whatsoever introduced

at the trial which would show that plaintiff at all times
did not have sufficient road width on her side of the street
to safely bypass any oncoming traffic.
Another disputed fact was whether the plaintiff made
an improper turn in cutting the corner.

Plaintiff and her

passenger both claim to have made a proper turn.

Defendant

and his passenger both testify that the corner was cut (T-169,
182,186,187).

As documented above, however, the physical

evidence showed that plaintiff's car was still on a 45° angle
at the time of impact, that the impact occurred either nineteen or thirty feet beyond the intersection, and that the
back of plaintiff's car at such point was still in defendant's
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lane of travel.
A final material fact in issue involved the plaintiff's
lookout.

She testified in her deposition that she did not

see the defendant's vehicle until she had made her turn and
passed all the way through the intersection (T-143-145).

At

trials she changed her testimony somewhat and attempted to
move back the point at which she first saw the defendant (T-122).
However, on cross examination she acknowledged that when she
first saw defendant's vehicle she traveled one car length
before impact (T-146); that she didn't have time to even apply
her brakes (T-146); that she didn't have time to attempt to
turn in either direction (T-147); and that she was beyond the
point where the accident could have been avoided (T-147).

She

further testified that as she approached the intersection she
looked in both directions and did not see defendant's vehicle
(although it was there plainly to be seen)(T-120,121,145).
She attempted to excuse her failure to keep a proper lookout
by claiming that her vision was blocked by a fence and a parked
car (T-140,141); however, the pictures introduced at trial
clearly show that the fence didn't block her vision (see wood
fence shown at extreme left in Exhibit P-3); and to claim that
a parked car excuses being unable to see what is beyond it
is rather incredible.
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Based upon the evidence establishing improper lookout
and the physical evidence showing that plaintiff made an
improper left turn, defendant made a motion for nonsuit
claiming that reasonable minds could do nothing other than
find negligence on the part of the plaintiff and that she
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law (T-164).
The court reserved its ruling on defendant's motion (T-164)
apparently prefering that the case be submitted to the jury.
The motion was never ruled upon.
At the conclusion of the evidence the case was argued
and submitted to the jury.

During the course of its delib-

erations the jury asked that a handwritten note be delivered
to the judge.

The note from the jury to the judge stated as

follows:
"We find that both parties were contributorily
negligent but may we award punitive damages to
the plaintiff? (R-4).
The note was discussed in chambers with counsel after which
the court wrote a reply on the note as follows:
"No.

See Instructions Nos. 4 and 5" (R-4).

Although the jury had made a finding of contributory
negligence it nevertheless returned a verdict for the plaintiff awarding no special damages and $2,000.00 general damages (R-31).

No request was made by either counsel to have
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the jury correct what appeared on its face to be an irregular verdict, and the juror was thereupon discharged by the
court (T-254).

At a later date counsel for the plaintiff

filed a motion for new trial with the trial court supported
by his Memorandum of Authorities (R-22,23).

The motion also

sought in the alternative the granting of an additur.

The

motion for new trial was considered by the trial court and
denied (R-19).

Plaintiff then appealed to this court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS PROPERLY DENIED
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
It is rather obvious from the facts of this case that
if the verdict of the jury was influenced by sympathy, prejudice or passion it worked in favor of the plaintiff and not
against her.

After making a determination that plaintiff

was contributorily negligent the jury still awarded plaintiff
$2,000.00 in damages, when in fact the judgment should have
been for "No cause of action".

Likewise if there was any

error in law it operated in favor of the plaintiff as she
shouldn't have been entitled to any judgment at all.

While

the verdict itself was irregular on its face in not awarding
special damages, the law is clear that any such irregularity
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is waived by not asking that it be corrected before the
jury is discharged.

Cohn vs. J. C. Penney Company, (Utah

1975) 537 P.2d 306; Langton vs. International Transport,
Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211; Lish vs. Utah Power
and Light Company, 27 Utah 2d 90, 493 P.2d 611; Jorgensen
vs. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934; Rule 47(r)Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Langton vs. International Transport, Inc., supra,
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in a personal
injury action and awarded special damages and property damages but no general damages.

The plaintiff thereafter made

a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) (5), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, claiming inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
The court pointed out the distinction between a verdict that
is irregular or defective and one that is regular on its
face, but which merely awards insufficient damages; holding
that a verdict which failed to include all of the items of
damages was one that is defective in form.

In such case the

court emphasized the need to have the jury correct the defect
under proper instructions from the court.

The court quoted

from the California case of Brown vs. Regan and stated as
follows:
"The proper procedure where an informal or
insufficient verdict has been returned is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for the trial court to require the verdict to return for further deliberation.
. . • It is well established by numerous
authorities that, when a verdict is not
in the proper form and the jury is not
required to clarify it, any error in said
verdict is waived by the party relying
thereon who at the time of its rendition
failed to make any request that its informality or uncertainty be corrected."
In explaining the reason why there is a waiver unless timely
objection is made the court in its opinion further stated
as follows:
"If counsel be permitted to remain mute
when a verdict is insufficient or informal,
he gains an unfair strategic advantage,
which the instant case clearly illustrates.
The evidence of defendant's negligence was
weak; the issue of whether the asserted
negligence of defendant was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries was weaker.
The evidence of plaintiff's contributory
negligence was considerable. It would
be most advantageous to plaintiff to be
granted a new trial, particularly if it
were limited to the issue of damages.
In either event, he would have an opportunity to present his case to a new jury.
On the other hand, if the court had sent
the jury out for further deliberation,
with additional instructions setting forth
clearly that the law does not permit the
jury to compromise liability and that
under the facts of the case the plaintiff,
if entitled to special damages, must also
receive compensation for his pain and
suffering and lost wages, there was a
real possibility that the verdict might
have been in favor of the defendant.
The silence of plaintiff's counsel, upon
hearing the verdict, is comprehensible,

-10-
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he could reasonably have concluded that the
jury was unsympathetic to his cause or
parsimonious, and he would, of course, prefer a new jury. There must be reasonable
rules to control the termination of litigation, if counsel has an opportunity to
correct error at the time of its occurrence
and he fails to do so, any objection based
thereupon is waived.11
The Langton Case was later followed in the case of
Lish vs. Utah Power and Light Company, supra, wherein the
court held as follows:
"(Plaintiff) contends that there is an irregularity in the verdict as finally rendered.
However, he permitted the jury to be excused
without requesting any clarification of the
verdict and so cannot properly expect this
court to do what could have been done by
the jury before it was discharged."
Cohn vs. J. C. Penney Company, supra, was another case
in which the jury awarded special damages and loss of income
but failed to make award of general damages.

In citing the

Langton Case as authority this court again held as follows:
"In the instant matter there was not merely
an inadequate award of general damages—
there was no award at all. The verdict
was deficient in form, and counsel had an
opportunity to have the jury sent back for
further deliberations. This he did not
do, perhaps fearing that the jury might
either award some nominal amount or even
change the verdict and award nothing to
the plaintiff. It would be a smart trial
tactic if he could have had a new trial
on damages only before a jury which
would not be acquainted with the weakness
of plaintiff's cause of action.
We think the Langton case disposes of
the present matter."
-11-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the instant case the reason for counselfs failure
to ask that the verdict be corrected is obvious.

He knew

that the jury had made a determination of contributory negligence and feared that if the jury be asked to correct the
judgment by giving them additional instructions to the effect
that they are not permitted to compromise liability, that
the most likely result would be a verdict of no cause of
action.

He thereupon allowed the jury to be discharged be-

fore making any objections as to the irregularity of the
verdict, hoping that he could get another day in court.

This

is the very thing that the law of the cited cases is designed
to prevent.
Plaintifffs argument that she had no opportunity to
object to the irregularity of the verdict is absolutely without merit.

There is nothing in the record to show that

counsel was deprived of his opportunity to object.
the verdict was read the jury was polled (T-253).
then thanked the jury for its services (T-254).

After
The judge

Then a

discussion was held off the record (T-254) before the jury
left the courtroom.

Counsel had plenty of opportunity to

request that the verdict be corrected and he simply chose
to remain silent.
This court has further announced the principal time
and time again to a large extent the granting or denying
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of a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be interfered with
unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.
Paul vs. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670,
judge heard plaintiff1s moti on for a new tr I al.

The trial •
He, of

course, was present throughout the entire trial and did
not feel that there was anything about the jury verdict
that would justify the granting of a new trial.
stated in Schneider vs. Suhrmann* * ':ta-

It was

2d 35, 327 P. 2d 822

that "The r efusal of the trial cc-.r- •_ . . odify the verdict
endows it with some further degree of sanctity which increases
our hesitancy in disturbing it upon review",

The above

authorities would compel an affirmance of the judgment of
the trial court.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN FAILING TO
INSTRUCT THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In Point II of appellant's brief she urges that the
court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct
that defendant vas neg] igent as a matter of .1 aw

Respondent

strongly disagrees that such would have been a proper instruction, the issue :;f plaintiff's negligence being a proper
jury questio. ; lowever, in any event, it is obvious that the

-13-
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jury found that the defendant was negligent so that the
failure to give such instruction could not possibly have
been prejudicial.

The handwritten note given to the judge

by the jury stated that it had found negligence on the part
of both plaintiff and defendant.

Thereafter the court's

instructions were not followed and a verdict returned for
the plaintiff.

Thus regardless of the verdict they found,

or the one they should have found, they would have had to
conclude that defendant was negligent.

The more important

issue in this case was plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The facts establishing contributory negligence are carefully
documented under the Statement of Facts in this brief, and
would support a finding of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.

Defendant's motion for nonsuit, which was

never ruled upon, should have been granted.
CONCLUSION
If anyone in this case is entitled to a new trial it
is defendant and not plaintiff.

Defendant is not entirely

happy about the verdict as it should have been for no cause
of action.

Defendant, however, is not seeking a new trial

and is willing to accept the judgment in the interests of
bringing the litigation to a close.

This accident occurred

in the year 1971 and now almost five years later the litigation is still continuing.

The parties have had their day
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in court.

A very capable trial judge has reviewed the

2 a s e a n d f o u n d n o g r o un d s f o i a i 1 e w t r i a ]

11 i s t i m e

that this litigation be brought to an end.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
David E . W e s t
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney ~-r 3esc;.:-.dent
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